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1 Prior to this time, China maintained a dual exchange rate system: an official exchange rate of
about 5.8 yuan to the dollar and a market swap rate (used mainly for trade transactions) of about
8.7 yuan to the dollar (at the end of 1993).   The reforms in 1994 unified the two rates.
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Summary
The continued rise in the U.S.-China trade imbalance has led to complaints from
various U.S. manufacturing firms and workers.  Some Members of Congress assert that
China’s policy of pegging its currency (the yuan) to the U.S. dollar constitutes a form
of currency manipulation, maintained to make Chinese exports cheaper, and its imports
more expensive, and that this policy has negatively affected U.S. employment in several
sectors.  This report evaluates that assertion, and considers other effects China’s peg has
on the U.S. economy.  These include the beneficial effects on consumption, interest
rates, and investment spending.  Nationwide, these effects should offset job loss in the
trade sector, at least in the medium term.  Several bills have been  introduced in the 109th
Congress to address China’s currency policy, including  H.R. 1216, H.R. 1498, H.R.
1575, S. 14, S. 295, S. 377, and S. 593; some would impose trade sanctions against
China unless it accepted a market-based system of currency valuation.  This report
summarizes CRS Report RL32165, China’s Exchange Rate Peg: Economic Issues and
Options for U.S. Trade Policy, and will be updated as events warrant.
China pegs its currency, the yuan (also called the renminbi), to the U.S. dollar.
Under this system, China’s central bank issues a reference dollar/yuan exchange rate
along with a limited band (about 0.3%) in which the reference rate is allowed to fluctuate.
This system has been in place with a peg of about 8.3 yuan to the dollar since 1994.1  The
Chinese central bank maintains this peg by buying (or selling) as many dollar-
denominated assets in exchange for newly printed yuan as needed to eliminate excess
demand (supply) for the yuan.  As a result, the exchange rate between the yuan and the
dollar basically stays the same, despite changing economic factors which could otherwise
cause the yuan to either appreciate or depreciate relative to the dollar.  Under a floating
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2 Many analysts argue that the sharp increase in China’s foreign exchange reserves (which grew
from $168 billion in 2000 to $403 billion in 2003, to $610 billion at the end of 2004) is one
indicator that the yuan  is  undervalued. 
3 The currency is convertible on a current account basis (such as for trade transactions), but not
on a capital account basis (for various types of financial flows, such as portfolio investment). In
addition, holdings of foreign exchange by Chinese firms and individuals are closely regulated by
the government. 
4 See Prepared Remarks of Dr. C. Fred Bergsten, President, Institute for International Economics,
before the House Small Business Committee, June 25, 2003.
exchange rate system, the relative demand for the two countries’ goods and assets would
determine the exchange rate of the yuan to the dollar. Many economists contend that for
the first several years of the peg, the fixed value was likely close to the market value.  But
in the past few years, economic conditions have changed such that the yuan would likely
have appreciated if it had been floating.2  Because its currency is not fully convertible in
international markets, and because it maintains tight restrictions and controls over capital
transactions, China can maintain the exchange rate peg and still use monetary policy to
pursue domestic goals (such as full employment).3 
U.S. Concerns About China’s Currency Peg
Many U.S. policymakers and business and labor representatives have charged that
China’s currency is significantly undervalued vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar (by as much as
40%), making Chinese exports to the United States cheaper, and U.S. exports to China
more expensive, than they would be if exchange rates were determined by market forces.
They further argue that the undervalued currency has contributed to the burgeoning U.S.
trade deficit with China (which has risen from $30 billion in 1994 to $162 billion in 2004)
and has hurt U.S. production and employment in several U.S. manufacturing sectors (such
as textiles and apparel and furniture) that are forced to compete domestically and
internationally against “artificially” low-cost goods from China.  Furthermore, some
analysts contend that China’s currency peg induces other East Asian countries to intervene
in currency markets in order to keep their currencies weak against the dollar in order to
compete with Chinese goods.4  Several groups are pressing the Bush Administration to
pressure China to either revalue its currency (by increasing the band in which it is allowed
to be traded in China) or to allow it to float freely in international markets.  President
Bush on a number of occasions has criticized China’s currency peg, stating that exchange
rates should be determined by market forces. 
China’s Concerns About Its Currency Peg
Chinese officials argue that its currency peg policy is not meant to favor exports over
imports, but instead to foster economic stability by tying its currency to the U.S. dollar at
a constant level, as many other countries do.  They have expressed concern that
abandoning the peg could spark an economic crisis in China and would especially be
damaging to its export industries at a time when painful economic reforms (such as
closing down inefficient state-owned enterprises) are being implemented.  They further
contend that the Chinese banking system is too underdeveloped and burdened with heavy
debt to be able to deal effectively with possible speculative pressures that could occur
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with a fully convertible currency.  The combination of a convertible currency and poorly
regulated financial system is seen to be one of the causes of the 1997-1998 Asian financial
crisis.  Chinese officials view economic stability as critical to sustaining political stability;
they fear an appreciated currency could cause deflation, reduce employment, and lower
wages in several sectors, and thus could cause worker unrest.  Chinese officials claim that
during the Asian crisis, when several other nations sharply devalued their currencies,
China “held the line” by not devaluing its currency (which might have prompted a new
round of destructive devaluations across Asia).  This policy was highly praised by U.S.
officials, including President Clinton.  During a visit to China in September  2003 by U.S.
Treasury Secretary John Snow, Chinese officials stated that, while making the yuan fully
convertible was a long term goal, China had no immediate plans to eliminate the peg.
However, Chinese officials have pledged  implement certain financial reforms, and in
October 2003, they agreed to a U.S. proposal to set up a joint technical cooperation
program to promote the development of China’s financial markets and to examine ways
China can move more quickly towards a floating exchange rate.
Economic Consequences of China’s Currency Peg
 If the yuan is undervalued against the dollar, as many critics charge, then there are
benefits and costs of this policy for the economies of both China and the United States.
Implications of the Peg for China’s Economy
If the yuan is undervalued, then Chinese exports to the United States are likely
cheaper than they would be if the currency were freely traded, providing a boost to
China’s export industries (which employ millions of workers and are a major source of
China’s productivity gains).  Eliminating exchange rate risk through a peg also increases
the attractiveness of China as a destination for foreign investment in export-oriented
production facilities.  However, an undervalued currency makes imports more expensive,
hurting Chinese consumers and Chinese firms that import parts, machinery, and raw
materials.  Such a policy, in effect, benefits Chinese exporting firms (many of which are
owned by foreign multinational corporations) at the expense of non-exporting Chinese
firms, especially those that rely on imported goods.  This may impede the most efficient
allocation of resources in the Chinese economy.  The accumulation of large foreign
exchange reserves by China may make it easier for Chinese officials to move more
quickly toward adopting a fully convertible currency (if the government feels it could
defend the currency against speculative pressures).  However, the accumulation of large
foreign exchange reserves also entails opportunity costs for China: such funds (instead of
sitting in the central bank) could be used to fund China’s massive development needs,
such as infrastructure improvements.
Implications of the Peg for the U.S. Economy
Effect on Exporters and Import-Competitors. When a fixed exchange rate
causes the yuan to be less expensive than it would be if it were determined by supply and
demand, it causes Chinese exports to be relatively inexpensive and U.S. exports to China
to be relatively expensive.  As a result, U.S. exports and the production of U.S. goods and
services that compete with Chinese imports fall, in the short run.  (Many of the affected
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5  There is a long run trend that is moving U.S. production away from manufacturing and toward
the service sector.  U.S. employment in manufacturing as a share of total nonagricultural
employment has fallen from 31.8% in 1960 to 22.4% in 1980 to 12.8% in 2002. This trend is
much larger than the Chinese currency issue, and is caused by changing technology (which
requires fewer workers to produce the same number of goods) and comparative advantage.  With
enhanced globalization, the theory of comparative advantage predicts the U.S. will produce
knowledge- and technology-intensive goods that it is best at producing for trade with countries,
such as China, who are better at producing labor-intensive goods.  Since many manufactured
goods are labor-intensive, comparative advantage leads to more manufacturing abroad, and less
in the United States.  Over time, it is likely that the trend shifting manufacturing abroad will
continue regardless of China’s currency peg.
6 Putting exchange rate issues aside, most economists maintain that trade is a win-win situation
for the economy as a whole, but produces losers within the economy.  This view derives from the
principle of comparative advantage, which states that trade shifts production to the goods a
country is relatively talented at producing from goods it is relatively untalented at producing.  As
trade expands, production of goods with a comparative disadvantage will decline in the U.S., to
the detriment of workers and investors in those sectors (offset by higher employment and profits
in sectors with a comparative advantage).  Economists generally argue that free trade should be
pursued because the gains from trade are large enough that the losers from trade can be
compensated by the winners, and the winners will still be better off.  See CRS Report RL32059.
firms are in the manufacturing sector.5)  This causes the trade deficit to rise and reduces
aggregate demand in the short run, all else equal.  On the other hand, over the long run,
the fixed exchange rate encourages trade (and investment) between the two countries by
eliminating exchange rate risk.  The reduced risk could make both imports and exports
higher than under a floating system.6
Effect on U.S. Consumers and Certain Producers.  A society’s economic
well-being is usually measured not by how much it can produce, but how much it can
consume.  An undervalued yuan that lowers the price of imports from China allows the
United States to increase its consumption through an improvement in the terms-of-trade.
Since changes in aggregate spending are only temporary, from a long-term perspective the
lasting effect of an undervalued yuan is to increase the purchasing power of U.S.
consumers.  Imports from China are not limited to consumption goods.  U.S. producers
also import capital equipment and inputs to final products from China.  An undervalued
yuan lowers the price of these U.S. products, increasing their output.
Effect on U.S. Borrowers.  An undervalued yuan also has an effect on U.S.
borrowers.  When the U.S. runs a current account deficit with China, an equivalent
amount of capital flows from China to the United States, as can be seen in the U.S.
balance of payments accounts.  This occurs because the Chinese central bank or private
Chinese citizens are investing in U.S. assets, which allows more U.S. capital investment
in plant and equipment to take place than would otherwise occur.  Capital investment
increases because the greater demand for U.S. assets puts downward pressure on U.S.
interest rates, and firms are now willing to make investments that were previously
unprofitable.  This increases aggregate spending in the short run, all else equal, and also
increases the size of the economy in the long run by increasing the capital stock.  
Private firms are not the only beneficiaries of the lower interest rates caused by the
capital inflow (trade deficit) from China.  Interest-sensitive household spending, on goods
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7 Nations, such as the United States, that fail to save enough to meet their investment needs must
obtain savings from other countries with high savings rates.  By obtaining foreign investment (in
effect, borrowing), the United States can consume more (including more imports) than it would
(continued...)
such as consumer durables and housing, is also higher than it would be if capital from
China did not flow into the United States.  In addition, a large proportion of the U.S.
assets bought by the Chinese, particularly by the central bank, are U.S. Treasury
securities, which fund U.S. federal budget deficits. According to the U.S. Treasury
Department, China (as of February 2005) held $196.5 billion in U.S. Treasury securities,
making China the second largest foreign holder of such securities, after Japan.  If the U.S.
trade deficit with China were eliminated, Chinese capital would no longer flow into this
country on net, and the government would have to find other buyers of its U.S. Treasuries.
This would increase the government’s interest payments.
Net Effect on the U.S. Economy.  In the medium run, an undervalued yuan
neither increases nor decreases aggregate demand in the United States.  Rather, it leads
to a compositional shift in U.S. production, away from U.S. exporters and import-
competing firms toward the firms that benefit from Chinese capital flows.  Thus, it is
expected to have no medium or long run effect on aggregate U.S. employment or
unemployment.  As evidence, one can consider that the U.S. had a historically large and
growing trade deficit throughout the 1990s at a time when unemployment reached a three-
decade low.  However, the gains and losses in employment and production caused by the
trade deficit will not be dispersed evenly across regions and sectors of the economy: on
balance, some areas will gain while others will lose.  And by shifting the composition of
U.S. output to a higher capital base, the size of the economy would be larger in the long
run as a result of the capital inflow/trade deficit.
Although the compositional shift in output has no negative effect on aggregate U.S.
output and employment in the long run, there may be adverse short-run consequences.
If output in the trade sector falls more quickly than the output of U.S. recipients of
Chinese capital rises, aggregate spending and employment could temporarily fall.  This
is more likely to be a concern if the economy is already sluggish than if it is at full
employment.  Otherwise, it is likely that government macroeconomic policy adjustment
and market forces can quickly compensate for any decline of output in the trade sector by
expanding other elements of aggregate demand.
The U.S.-China Trade Deficit in the Context of the Overall U.S. Trade
Deficit.  While China is a large trading partner, it accounted for only 13.4% of U.S.
imports in 2004 and 23% of the sum of the bilateral trade deficits.  Over a span of several
years, a country with a floating exchange rate can run an ongoing overall trade deficit for
only one reason: a domestic imbalance between saving and investment.  This has been the
case for the United States over the past two decades, where saving as a share of gross
domestic product (GDP) has been in gradual decline.  On the one hand, the U.S. has high
rates of productivity growth and strong economic fundamentals that are conducive to high
rates of capital investment.  On the other hand, it has a chronically low household saving
rate, and recently a negative government saving rate as a result of the budget deficit.  As
long as Americans save little, foreigners will use their saving to finance profitable
investment opportunities in the U.S.; the trade deficit is the result.7  The returns to
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7 (...continued)
if investment were funded by domestic savings alone — this results in a trade deficit.
foreign-owned capital will flow to foreigners instead of Americans, but the returns to U.S.
labor utilizing foreign-owned capital will flow to U.S. labor.
According to Chinese statistics, more than half of what China exports to the world
is produced by foreign-invested firms in China, including U.S. companies, which, in many
cases, have shifted production  to China in order to gain access to China’s low-cost labor.
(The returns to capital of U.S. owned firms in China flow to Americans.)  Such firms
import raw materials and components (much of which come from East Asia) for assembly
in China.  As a result, China tends to run trade deficits with East Asian countries and trade
surpluses with countries with high consumer demand, such as the United States.  Overall,
in 2004, China had a $32 billion trade surplus (Chinese data), indicating that China had
a $130 billion trade deficit with the world excluding the United States.  These factors
imply that much of the increase in U.S. imports (and hence, the rising U.S. trade deficit
with China) is largely the result of China becoming a production platform for many
foreign companies, rather than unfair Chinese trade policies.  
For these reasons, economists generally are more concerned with the overall trade
deficit than bilateral trade balances.  Because of comparative advantage, it is natural that
a country will have some trading partners from which it imports more, and some trading
partners to which it exports more.  For example, the U.S. has a trade deficit with Austria
and a trade surplus with the Netherlands even though both countries use the euro, which
floats against with the dollar.  Of concern to the United States is that its low saving rate
makes it so reliant on foreigners to finance its investment opportunities, and not the fact
that much of the capital comes from China.  If the U.S. did not borrow from China as a
result of the exchange rate peg, it would still have to borrow from other countries.
Proposed Legislation in the 109th Congress  
Eleven bills were introduced in the 108th that sought to address China’s currency
policy or countries that “manipulated” their exchange rates.  In the 109th Congress,  S.14
(Stabenow) S. 295 (Schumer), and H.R. 1575 (Spratt) would raise U.S. tariffs on Chinese
goods by an additional 27.5% unless China appreciated its currency to a level at or near
market value.  S. 377 (Lieberman) directs the President to negotiate with countries that
manipulate their currency and to institute proceedings under the relevant U.S. and
international trade laws if an agreement is not reached.  In addition, H.R. 1216 (English)
and S. 593 (Collins) would apply U.S. countervailing laws (dealing with government
subsidies)  to nonmarket economies, such as China.  Many Members contend that China’s
currency peg constitutes a form of government subsidy.  H.R. 1498 (Tim Ryan) would
apply U.S. countervailing laws against any nation that manipulated its currency.
On   April 6, 2005, the Senate failed (by a vote of 33 to 67) to table an amendment,
S.Amdt. 309 (Schumer) to S. 600 (Foreign Affairs Authorization Act), which would
impose a 27.5% tariff on Chinese goods if China failed to substantially appreciate its
currency to market levels.  In response to the vote, the Senate leadership moved to allow
a vote on S. 295 (which has same language as S.Amdt. 309) no later than July 27, 2005.
